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Looking More Closely at the Platypus of Formal
Rulemaking
Kent Barnett

Legal scholar argues that the oftcriticized formal rulemaking process has
virtues in proper settings.
Formal, ontherecord rulemaking is the platypus of administrative law. Unlike the
common noticeandcomment rulemaking process, formal rulemaking involves
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adjudicatorylike hearings with an administrative law judge, testimony, cross
examination, and an exclusive record. Formal rulemaking prioritizes participation by
affected parties, reasoned decisionmaking with a closed record, and transparency
over noticeandcomment rulemaking’s preference for increased agency flexibility.
Scholars, policy makers, and other interested parties have advocated for killing this
gawky beast. Indeed, in the 1970s, the U.S. Supreme Court, in United States v.
AlleghenyLudlum Steel and United States v. Florida East Coast Railway, strapped
formal rulemaking to the gurney. But formal rulemaking still has its uses, and it
should be considered on its merits in particular regulatory situations.
The recently proposed Regulatory Accountability Act (RAA) has brought attention to
formal rulemaking, as the bill would impose on agencies a “public hearing”
requirement that is a close relative of formal rulemaking. Among other things, the Act
would require that agencies provide a public hearing in certain circumstances for
“major” or “highimpact” rules—those with an economic “effect” over certain dollar
thresholds.
Some observers, including scholars affiliated with the Center for Progressive Reform,
have criticized the RAA’s publichearing provision as giving regulated parties an unfair
advantage over the public and beneficiaries. Only regulated firms, these observers
argue, will have access to lawyers to participate in these “impracticable, wasteful, [and]
burdensome” hearings.
But neither formal rulemaking nor its close relative in the RAA should be dismissed as
burdensome or antiregulatory in all cases. Under select circumstances, perhaps such
as those in the RAA, formal procedures, with their focus on participation, careful
decisionmaking, and transparency, can ensure that agencies are using their powers
appropriately—advancing both conservative and progressive ends.
Despite my concerns over a few of the RAA’s provisions—and the bill’s failure to go
further in cleaning up the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)—I am much less
skeptical of the RAA’s publichearing provisions for five reasons.
First, formal rulemaking’s detractors, as Aaron Nielson has chronicled, have framed
that procedure’s problems in ways that are more mythical than real. Yes, delays and
other problems arose in some highprofile rules (including the Food and Drug
Administration’s (FDA) infamous peanutbutter rule), but even those problems were
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not as significant or inevitable as they have been remembered. Other agencies, such as
the U.S. Department of Agriculture and numerous state agencies, have successfully
used formal rulemaking by implementing appropriate agency procedures and
remaining focused on their regulatory goals.
To be sure, scholars deem the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) MagnusonMoss
hybrid rulemaking proceedings, which are similar to the RAA’s public hearings, for
tradespecific regulations a failure. Many of the FTC’s rules adopted under this process
took more than two years to promulgate or were never finalized. But instead of casting
all of the blame on the inherent nature of hybrid or formal rulemaking, critics should
consider why these proceedings failed in most cases. After all, even the FTC used
hybrid rulemaking successfully in some cases. The FTC, like the FDA in the peanut
butter rule, may simply have given some of the rules low priority. And it is far from
clear that hybrid rulemaking was appropriate because those rules were not necessarily
highly significant or even especially factladen, where adjudicatorylike procedures
would be useful. Instead, the additional procedure may have simply allowed affected
industries more time to pressure agency members—perhaps through congressional
allies—into slowing down, watering down, or forgoing rulemaking.
Second, although the Supreme Court may have effectively banished formal
rulemaking, it did so only in strikingly unpersuasive decisions (AlleghenyLudlum and
Florida East Coast Railway), as Gary Lawson has ably described. My recent perusal of
the Justices’ archives indicates that the Court did not fully understand the implications
or long history of formal rulemaking. In what the Court viewed as boring ratemaking
cases that it was forced to hear under its mandatory jurisdiction, the Court allowed
formal rulemaking—sua sponte—to fall into desuetude as a way to get around certain
APA requirements.
Third, formal rulemaking is not necessarily industryfriendly. Indeed, Congress, in the
2010 DoddFrank Act, called for formal rulemaking to further progressive ideological
ends by permitting the Office of Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) to preempt certain
state laws only after ontherecord adjudication or rulemaking. Legislative history
indicated that prior to DoddFrank, the OCC had eagerly preempted state law as a way
of attracting feepaying financial institutions to select it as their prudential regulator.
Formal proceedings, by requiring agencies to build a record and rely exclusively upon
it, can serve as a tool for ensuring that agencies use their expertise and forgo actions
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that simply benefit regulated parties or the agency itself. Formal rulemaking, in other
words, can be a device for limiting, as opposed to furthering, regulatory capture.
Moreover, the RAA’s publichearing requirements apply to the promulgation and
repeal of major and highimpact rules. Although an earlier version of the bill only
included the costs of regulation in setting thresholds for major or highimpact rules,
the broader language in the current bill refers to “effects,” which include costs and
savings. Thus, formal rulemaking and similar public hearings can help protect the
public from unwarranted regulatory and deregulatory impulses.
Fourth, although I share concerns over ensuring that the formal rulemaking process is
fair and open to all parties—and not a vehicle for regulatory capture—I am not sure
how meaningful the problem is here. Ordinarily, I would expect publicinterest groups
to have lawyers at the ready, as they do in environmental and consumer matters, to
represent less engaged or less wellfunded parties. Likewise, if the agency is
attempting to promulgate—as opposed to repeal—regulations, I would expect that the
agency’s interest is generally aligned with the public’s, not with that of the regulated
parties seeking the hearing.
Finally, although a full consideration of when formal rulemaking can be helpful might
take much more space than this essay can provide, as a preliminary matter it would
seem that formal rulemaking would make the most sense when some combination of
the following circumstances exists: where facts, instead of discretionary decisions, are
determinative; where the rules at issue are significant and will receive priority from
the agency; where particular parties are especially affected, such as in ratemakings;
and where regulatory capture is likely. The key point is that these circumstances
dovetail with some of the same considerations called for by the RAA in deciding when
to hold a public hearing. Instead of questioning formal rulemaking’s very existence,
scholars and policymakers should recognize that formal rulemaking still can be useful,
even if its domain is limited.
Despite its unconventional appearance, formal rulemaking remains one of
administrative law’s four key forms of agency action—along with formal and informal
adjudication and informal rulemaking. It may still have some appropriate uses, even if
those are relatively rare. As more scholars, policymakers, and interested parties
grapple with formal rulemaking’s domain, we might collectively determine that public
hearings do not make sense even under the conditions that the RAA would demand.
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But we should evaluate formal rulemaking on its merits in each situation—and not
succumb to its myths.
Kent Barnett is an Associate Professor at the University of Georgia
School of Law.
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